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Within the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence a non-Kolmogorovian kind of epistemic uncer-
tainty arises, which is encoded using multi-valued maps. We analyse the possible implications
such non-Kolmogorovian epistemic uncertainty may have for Bell-type inequalities relating to the
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm (EPRB) thought experiment. Our analysis leads to a notion of con-
textuality concerning complexes of physical measurement conditions. The use of multi-valued maps
reveals an implicit link between this contextuality and counterfactual outcomes, and results in a
formulation wherein the states of measurement devices are explicitly taken into account as part of
the probabilistic event space. This reflects a conception of measurement that was advocated by Bell
some time ago. It results in context-conditioned measure-theoretic probabilities, which do not obey
Bell-type inequalities, but which are nonetheless perfectly compatible with local classical physical
models. We give an example of a local classical model that reproduces the quantum mechanical
predictions and that fits within the contextual framework.
PACS numbers: 03.65.Ud, 02.50.Cw
I. INTRODUCTION
Although we have recently celebrated the fiftieth year
since Bell’s original work [1], Bell-type inequalities re-
main a contentious issue [2]. From a mathematical per-
spective Bell-type inequalities merely express constraints
on random variables defined over a single Kolmogorov
probability space. It is quite remarkable that such seem-
ingly innocuous and straightforward results of probabil-
ity theory have produced such heated and protracted de-
bates within physics [3, 4]. In the past Stapp claimed that
Bell’s inequality is “the most profound discovery of sci-
ence” [5]. On the other hand, more recently Khrennikov
has claimed that “The only value of Bell’s arguments was
the great stimulation of experimental technologies for en-
tangled photons.” [6]. It seems that those who agree with
Stapp tend to be physicists, while those who agree with
Khrennikov tend to be probability theorists.
In this paper we will argue that a single Kolmogorov
space is very narrow as the basis for the treatment of
realistic experiments. This limits the power of Bell-
type inequalities in constraining the interpretation of
physical models quite considerably. Our alternative ap-
proach utilises concepts from the Dempster-Shafer theory
of evidence [7, 8]. Unlike Kolmogorovian probabilities
Dempster-Shafer probabilities are not additive, which
makes the Dempster-Shafer theory more general [7, 8].
The main use we find for this theory is in the identifi-
cation of a non-Kolmogorovian kind of epistemic uncer-
tainty. This uncertainty is associated with a probabilistic
event space whenever two or more observables are oper-
ationally incompatible. It is encoded using multi-valued
maps, which result in the replacement of a single Kol-
mogorov space with multiple Kolmogorov spaces, each
labeled by distinct measurement contexts. Within the
treatment of EPRB-type experiments, the multi-valued
maps allow us to establish a link between measurement
contexts and counterfactual outcomes. When hidden
variables are considered the multi-valued maps result in
a contextual approach similar to Khrennikov’s [6, 9].
We begin in section II by considering Bell-type inequal-
ities involving empirical data from a table. Such inequali-
ties are based on phenomenological arguments alone and
make no explicit reference to hidden-variables [10, 11].
Instead they concern counterfactual outcomes of hypo-
thetical measurements. Using the Dempster-Shafer the-
ory enables us to probabilistically treat counterfactual
outcomes differently to factual outcomes. The proba-
bilistic uncertainty associated with the former is non-
Kolmogorovian (despite being purely epistemic), while
the uncertainty in the latter is of the usual Kolmogoro-
vian variety. In section III we provide a treatment involv-
ing hidden-variables wherein multi-valued maps provide
contextual observables and context-conditioned proba-
bilities. These quantities are not constrained by Bell-
type inequalities. In section IV we relate our contextual
approach to conventional approaches both rigorous and
heuristic, and assess the significance of Bell’s locality as-
sumption. In section V we give an explicit example of a
classical, deterministic, local model of an EPRB-type ex-
periment that fits within our contextual approach, and
that reproduces the quantum predictions. Finally, we
summarise our findings in section VI.
II. THE EPRB EXPERIMENT
In Bohm’s version of the EPR experiment there are
two spin-half particles produced by a common source.
These particles travel in opposite directions labeled left
and right. The spin of the left particle is measured us-
ing a Stern-Gerlach (SG) device aligned along one of two
possible directions a or a′, and the right particle is mea-
sured by a similar SG device aligned along either b or b′.
The generalised Bell-type CHSH inequalities refer to the
following theorem [12].
2Theorem. Let (Ω,Σ, µ) be a Kolmogorov probability
space. Let real random variables A,A′ : Ω → {±} rep-
resent the spin observables of the left particle along di-
rections a and a′ respectively, and let B,B′ : Ω → {±}
represent the spin observables for the right particle along
b and b′ respectively. The following Clauser-Horne-
Shimony-Holt (CHSH) inequalities hold;
|f | := |〈AB〉+ 〈AB′〉 − 〈A′B〉+ 〈A′B′〉| ≤ 2 (1)
where the correlations are defined by
〈CC′〉 :=
∫
Ω
dµ(ω)C(ω)C′(ω). (2)
The proof is almost trivial, but is omitted for brevity.
A. Phenomenological treatments and the
Dempster-Shafer theory
In a typical EPRB experiment measurements of the
spins of an ensemble of N particle pairs results in a table
of values such as that given in I. We let ΩO denote the set
of 2N outcomes explicitly appearing in such a table. We
denote by ΩKPV the set of values (KPVs) that are known
to have been possessed by the particles at the time each
particle was measured. Trivially, any reasonable theory
of physics allows us to set ΩO ≡ ΩKPV.
A standard argument that a local deterministic classi-
cal theory cannot violate the CHSH inequalities proceeds
as follows. Since, in a deterministic classical theory, the
particles are assumed to possess spin values in all direc-
tions whether or not they have been measured, one can
imagine that the blank entries in the table I are in fact
filled with variables which can take values + or −. Let
us denote by ΩUPV the set of unknown spin values pos-
sessed by the particles (UPVs). There are 22N concrete
choices that can be made for ΩUPV as a set of 2N values
each of which is either + or −. These different choices
are labeled ΩiCO, i = 1, ..., 2
2N . Each ΩiCO represents a
set of numbers called counterfactual outcomes. If, con-
trary to the actual experiment that we are describing, we
supposed that somehow all four spin directions a, a′, b, b′
were measured for each particle pair, then we would ob-
tain a complete table Ωi = ΩO ∪ ΩiCO where the index i
takes a fixed value within 1, ..., 22N . Each Ωi comprises a
complete table of outcomes, and each table can be viewed
as a Kolmogorov space Ωi in which the probability for an
outcome is simply it’s frequency of occurrence within the
table.
However, attempting to encode local classical deter-
minism by making a concrete choice for ΩUPV as one of
the ΩiCO conflates physical and probabilistic assumptions
in way that may not be justified. Such an assumption
is much stronger than classical determinism, because it
assumes not only that there exist possessed values, but
also that these values are known from having performed
Run/ Left particle Right particle
Particle pair a a′ b b′
1 + ? + ?
2 ? + ? −
3 − ? + ?
4 ? − − ?
...
...
N − (+) (−) +
TABLE I: A typical table of data collected in an EPRB exper-
iment. Each run consists of one spin measurement on each
particle. Each spin measurement is in one of two possible
directions— a or a′ for the left particle, and b or b′ for the
right particle. The set of all entries is denoted Ω. The set of
all entries containing either + or − is denoted ΩKPV. The set
of all entries containing a ? is denoted ΩUPV. In a complete
table ΩKPV = Ω and ΩUPV = ∅, so in a complete table the
unknown entries would also contain outcomes ±. An example
is given by the outcomes in brackets in the N ’th row. Since
such outcomes do not exist in any table of data produced by
an actual experiment, they are termed counterfactual. There
are 22N possible permutations of 2N variables j = ±. Each
permutation comprises a set ΩiCO, i = 1, ..., 2
2N . For fixed i
the set ΩiCO gives one possible way to fill in the blank entries
with counterfactual outcomes ±.
measurements. The assumption that particles can simul-
taneously possess definite spin values in different direc-
tions, does not by itself mean that we should assign rel-
ative frequencies to both KPVs and UPVs, as though
both are measurement outcomes. Only KPVs should be
treated as measurement outcomes. Put slightly differ-
ently, the assumption that possessed values merely exist
does not mean that we should necessarily treat the two
sets ΩKPV ≡ ΩO and ΩUPV as part of the same prob-
ability space. Such a probabilistic restriction entails a
physical constraint which is different to the one we seek
to impose.
Within a single Kolmogorov probability space all prob-
abilities whether they are taken to pertain to UPVs or
to KPVs are required to satisfy the same rules. Since
UPVs are unknown, their probability assignments must
be subjective. On the other hand KPVs appearing ex-
plicitly in a table are afforded probability assignments
in the form of objective relative frequencies. Clearly a
single Kolmogorov space is too limited to even allow for
the possibility that these two distinct types of probability
might be treated differently. However, if we employ the
Dempster-Shafer theory, such a distinction becomes pos-
sible. Subjective UPV-probabilities and objective KPV-
frequencies are generally viewed differently. The uncer-
tainty associated with UPVs is interpreted as uncertainty
in the underlying event space and is non-Kolmogorovian,
although it is entirely epistemic.
3Rather than viewing table I as defining 22N Kol-
mogorov spaces, we instead view it as defining a single
Dempster-Shafer probability space Ω := ΩKPV ∪ ΩUPV
in a sense that will become clear in what follows. The
basic idea in our approach is to associate a multi-valued
map Γc with each experimental context c. A context c
is defined as a particular experimental arrangement of
measurement devices, preparation devices etc. Thus, an
experiment involving several measurement contexts actu-
ally corresponds to several sub-experiments each associ-
ated with a different context. If we combine probabilities
conditioned on different contexts it is quite possible to vi-
olate the CHSH inequalities. Within any one context c,
only a subset of possible measurements can actually be
performed, and we cannot associate definite relative fre-
quencies with outcomes of measurements that cannot be
made within c. The multi-valued map Γc only allows us
to associate upper and lower subjective probabilities with
UPVs. In this sense counterfactual outcomes are related
to measurement contexts through the multi-valued maps.
In the EPRB setup the different contexts are
a, a′, b, b′, ab, a′b, ab′, a′b′ corresponding to differ-
ent possible settings of the SG devices. The contexts
a, a′ make no reference to the the right particle’s SG de-
vice, and likewise b, b′ do not refer to the left particle’s
SG device. The remaining contexts (namely ab, a′b, ab′
and a′b′) specify an arrangement of both devices simul-
taneously.
Let us consider first a complete table of known val-
ues Ω ≡ ΩKPV for the outcomes of measurements of the
random variables A,A′, B,B′ : Ω → {±}. The table
can be divided into rows Ων , ν = 1, ..., N and columns
Ωc, c = a, a
′, b, b′. The intersection Ωνc := Ων∩Ωc is sim-
ply the singleton set {ωνc} consisting of the νc’th table
entry. Since every entry has value + or− we can partition
Ω in terms of disjoint subsets as Ω = Ω+ ∪ Ω−. We can
now define useful intersections such as Ω+νc := Ωνc ∩Ω+,
which is empty if ωµc = − and is equal to Ωνc otherwise.
Considering only a single particle, we can define the
following relative frequencies
P (C = ±) = P (Ω±c ) =
1
N
N∑
ν=1
|Ω+νc| =
N±c
N
(3)
where C = A,A′, B,B′, c = a, a′, b, b′. Here |S| is used
to denote the cardinality of the set S, and N+c = |Ω+c |
and N−c = |Ω−c | denote the number of entries in the c’th
column with value + and value − respectively; N+c +
N−c = N . Considering both particles together we can
define the joint coincidence frequencies
P (Ωjc,Ω
k
c′) :=
1
N
N∑
ν=1
|Ωjνc||Ωkνc′ | ≡
N jkcc′
N
(4)
where j = ± and k = ±. The above probabilities can be
used to define individual averages and joint correlations
as
〈C〉 = 1
N
∑
j=±
jP (Ωjc),
〈CC′〉 = 1
N
∑
j,k=±
jkP (Ωjc,Ω
k
c′). (5)
In the case that the table is complete Ω = ΩKPV the data
necessarily obeys all Bell-type inequalities.
Now consider the case in which the table has missing
entries corresponding to UPVs. The total space can be
partitioned as before as Ω = Ω+ ∪ Ω−, but now we also
have the disjoint partitioning Ω = ΩKPV∪ΩUPV. We can
also form the intersections ΩjKPV,νc := Ω
j
νc ∩ ΩKPV and
ΩjUPV,νc := Ω
j
νc∩ΩUPV. The set ΩjKPV,νc is empty if ωνc
is unknown and is equal to Ωjνc otherwise. Likewise the
set ΩjUPV,νc is empty if ωνc is known and is equal to Ω
j
νc
otherwise.
With each individual context c we associate the multi-
valued map Γc : Ωc =
⋃
ν Ωνc → Σ{±} defined by
Γc(ωc) :=


+ ω ∈ Ω+KPV,c,
− ω ∈ Ω−KPV,c,
{±} ω ∈ ΩUPV,c,
(6)
and with each joint context cc′ we associate the multi-
valued map Γcc′ :
⋃
ν Ωνc × Ωνc′ → Σ{±}×{±} defined
by
Γcc′(ωc, ωc′) :=

(j, k) (ωc, ωc′) ∈
⋃
ν Ω
j
KPV,νc × ΩkKPV,νc′ ,
{(j,+), (j,−)} (ωc, ωc′) ∈
⋃
ν Ω
j
KPV,νc × ΩUPV,νc′ ,
{(+.j), (−, j)} (ωc, ωc′) ∈
⋃
ν ΩUPV,νc × ΩjKPV,νc′ ,
{±} × {±} (ωc, ωc′) ∈
⋃
ν ΩUPV,νc × ΩUPV,νc′ .
(7)
These maps give rise to multiple upper and lower sets.
For example, for j = ±
j∗Γc := {ωc : ∅ 6= Γc(ωc) ⊂ {j}} = ΩjKPV,c
j∗Γc := {ωc : Γc(ωc) ∩ {j} 6= ∅} = ΩjKPV,c ∪ ΩUPV,c (8)
and for j, k = ±
(j, k)∗Γ
cc′
=
⋃
ν
ΩjKPV,νc × ΩkKPV,νc′
(j, k)∗Γcc′ =⋃
ν
(ΩjKPV,νc ∪ ΩUPV,νc)× (ΩkKPV,νc′ ∪ ΩUPV,νc′).
(9)
We can now define upper and lower probabilities using
(3) and (4). Since each multi-valued map is associated
with a specific context, so too are the upper and lower
4probabilities. For example, using Γc we have
P∗c(j) := P (j∗Γc) =
|ΩjKPV,c|
N
,
P ∗c(j) := P (j∗Γc) =
|ΩjKPV,c|+ |ΩUPV,c|
N
. (10)
The difference P ∗c(Ωjc) − P∗c(Ωjc) = P (ΩUPV,c) repre-
sents Dempster’s “don’t know” probability associated
with ΩUPV,c. That this quantity is nonzero reflects the
fact that we cannot reveal any information about the
value of the random variable C, within the context c′.
More colloquially, we “don’t know” what the values of C
are, if what we are measuring is C′.
In the case of measurements on both particles we have
within the context cc′
P∗cc′(j, k) := P [(j, k)∗Γc ] =
1
N
N∑
ν=1
|ΩjKPV,νc||ΩkKPV,νc′ |,
P ∗cc
′
(j, k) := P [(j, k)∗Γc ]
=
1
N
N∑
ν=1
|ΩjKPV,νc ∪ ΩUPV,νc||ΩkKPV,νc′ ∪ ΩUPV,νc′ |.
(11)
In this case the “don’t know” difference is associated with
the cases in which we do not know the value of C for the
left-particle or we do not know the value of C′ for the
right-particle. If we restrict our attention to a single one-
particle context c, then we cannot meaningfully associate
frequencies with the values of C′ 6= C. Similarly in the
two-particle case restricted to the context cc′ we cannot
meaningfully associate frequencies with a pair of observ-
ables (D,D′) for which D 6= C or D′ 6= C′. We can only
meaningfully give subjective upper and lower probability
intervals in these cases. Combinations of these subjective
probabilities are quite capable of violating Bell-type in-
equalities, though the sense in which such combinations
are really meaningful raises delicate questions.
There is however, a way to violate the CHSH in-
equalities with meaningful contextual averages, which
are naturally obtained from the Dempster-Shafer multi-
valued maps. Each context c defines an observable C
whose domain is the set of points for which Γc is single-
valued. The domain of such an observable is called a
domain of certainty — a notion that plays a central role
in the Dempster-Shafer treatment we employ. Within
phenomenological treatments to EPRB-type experiments
observables with disjoint domains of certainty could be
termed incompatible. For example, considering only one
particle we define C : ΩKPV,c → {±} by C := Γc|KPV.
In the two-particle case we can also define the prod-
uct variable CC′ :
⋃
ν ΩKPV,νc × ΩKPV,νc′ → {±} by
CC′ := Γ1cc′Γ
2
cc′ |KPV, which denotes the product of the
cartesian components of Γcc′ restricted to the subset⋃
ν ΩKPV,νc × ΩKPV,νc′ . Any two distinct random vari-
ables so defined are incompatible. With respect to these
variables averages are only defined over domains of cer-
tainty;
〈C〉c =
∑
j=±
N∑
ν=1
j|ΩjKPV,νc|
|ΩKPV,c| ,
〈CC′〉cc′ =
∑
j,k=±
N∑
ν=1
jk|ΩjKPV,νc||ΩkKPV,νc′ |
|⋃µΩKPV,µc × ΩKPV,µc′ | . (12)
Substituting these expressions into (1) it is clear that (1)
can be violated. In fact, the upper bound on |f | becomes
4 rather than 2.
Along with the above averages we can define context
restricted probabilities
Pc(C = j) :=
N∑
ν=1
|ΩjKPV,νc|
|ΩKPV,c| ,
Pcc′(C = j, C
′ = k) :=
N∑
ν=1
|ΩjKPV,νc||ΩkKPV,νc′ |
|⋃µΩKPV,µc × ΩKPV,µc′ | .
(13)
The first of these represents the frequency with which the
outcome C = j is obtained given that the experiment is
actually set up to measure C, i.e., given that the context
is c. The second represents the probability that (j, k) is
obtained given that both C and C′ are actually simulta-
neously measured, i.e., given that the context is cc′. The
relevance of this type of conditional probability in rela-
tion to EPRB-type experiments was first pointed out by
A. Fine [13]. In the treatment above context conditioned
probabilities and averages generally violate all Bell-type
inequalities, but nothing about this more general proba-
bilistic treatment precludes the physical assumptions of
classical determinism and locality.
III. INCLUDING HIDDEN-VARIABLES
Most treatments of EPRB-type experiments includ-
ing Bell’s original treatment, start with the assumption
that for each particle pair we can use hidden-variables to
give a complete, classically deterministic specification of
the real experimental state. These hidden-variables are
assumed to belong to a single Kolmogorov probability
space. Averages are defined over this one space, and the
CHSH inequalities (1) necessarily hold. In this section
we will relax the latter assumption and define contex-
tual random variables whose domains are the domains of
certainty of specific Dempster-Shafer multi-valued maps.
A. Rigorous hidden-variable treatment
First, for comparative purposes, we provide a rigor-
ous formulation of the CHSH inequalities. We con-
sider the standard EPRB setup in which the spins of
5two particles produced by a common source are mea-
sured. We formulate the present treatment within a sin-
gle Kolmogorov space (Ω,ΣΩ, µ). We define the variables
A,A′ : Ω→ {±} representing spin observables in the di-
rections a, a′ for the left particle, and similarly we define
the spin observables B,B′ : Ω → {±} for the right par-
ticle. The directions of these spin observables coincide
with the contexts a, a′, b, b′ referring to the SG device
alignments. We define the sets Ωc := C
−1({±}) and
+c := C
−1(+) where C = A,A′, B,B′ and c = a, a′, b, b′.
We also define the real random vector X : Ω→ {±}4 by
X(ω) := (A(ω), A′(ω), B(ω), B′(ω)). Finally we assume
that ω ∈ Ω can be viewed as giving a complete descrip-
tion of the underlying reality within the experiment, i.e.,
ω represents a complete ontic state of the total physi-
cal system. With everything defined as such we can now
give the two-particle probabilities relevant to Bell-type
inequalities as
µ(C = j, C′ = k) ≡
∫
jc∩kc′
dµ(ω). (14)
More generally we have
µ (X = (j, k, l,m)) ≡
∫
ja∩ka′∩lb∩mb′
dµ(ω). (15)
There are 24 = 16 permutations of the outcomes
j, k, l,m = ± appearing in the above expression, giv-
ing the same number of probabilities µ (X = (j, k, l,m)).
These probabilities act as a basis in the sense that they
can be used to express any other (absolute) probability.
Examples of single-particle and two-particle probabilities
are given by
µ(A = j) =
∑
k,l,m
µ (X = (j, k, l,m)) ,
µ(A = j, B = l) =
∑
k,m
µ (X = (j, k, l,m)) . (16)
Single-particle and two-particle averages are given by
〈C〉 :=
∫
Ω
dµ(ω)C(ω),
〈CC′〉 :=
∫
Ω
dµ(ω)C(ω)C′(ω). (17)
Despite the fact that for a single particle we cannot si-
multaneously attribute known possessed values to both
of the observables A and A′, equation (17) does not dis-
tinguish between the averages like 〈AA′〉, and meaningful
two-particle correlations such as 〈AB〉. Similarly the for-
malism does not itself distinguish between the probabil-
ities µ (X = (j, k, l,m)) in which outcomes are simulta-
neously associated with all observables, and probabilities
like µ(A = j, B = l), which only associates outcomes
with observables that can be simultaneously measured.
In other words, because it has been built using a single
Kolmogorov space the above hidden-variable approach
treats counterfactual outcomes in the same way as the
conventional phenomenological approaches discussed in
section II A. In short, the above approach assumes that
counterfactual outcomes can be treated in the same way
as factual outcomes. It is convenient to refer to this as-
sumption as simply the counterfactual assumption.
The quantities above can be written in terms of con-
crete probability densities by defining a Borel measur-
able chart Λ : Ω → Rn consisting of hidden-variables
that reveal the underlying physical states ω ∈ Ω. If
we denote by B(Rn) the Borel subsets of Rn, the triple
(Rn,B(Rn), PΛ := µ ◦ Λ−1) defines a concrete Kol-
mogorov space. One can then define the observables C˜ :=
C ◦Λ−1 over this space, and one can define the joint dis-
tribution function FΛ : R
n → [0, 1] by FΛ(λ1, ..., λn) :=
PΛ(Λ1 ≤ λ1, ...,Λn ≤ λn). The probability density asso-
ciated with PΛ is defined by ρΛ := ∂
nFΛ/∂λ1...∂λn. The
number ρΛ(λ) characterises the observer’s epistemic, but
purely “Kolmogorovian” uncertainty, as to the underly-
ing physical state ω, Λ(ω) = λ. This interpretation is in-
herited from the interpretation given to the Kolmogorov
probability measure µ. The assumption of classical de-
terminism means the observable C˜ is assumed to pos-
sess the definite value C˜(λ) in the state λ. Note that
the formalism distinguishes between two distinct types of
state—an ontic state ω (or equivalently λ = Λ(ω)), and
an epistemic state ρΛ. A simple example of the above
formalism at work is given later on in section IVA. For
now we note that equations (14) and (17) can be written
PΛ(C˜ = j, C˜
′ = k) =
∫
j˜c∩k˜c′
dPΛ(λ) =
∫
j˜c∩k˜c′
dnλρΛ(λ)
(18)
and
〈C˜〉 =
∫
Rn
dnλρΛ(λ)C˜(λ)
〈C˜C˜′〉 =
∫
Rn
dnλρΛ(λ)C˜(λ)C˜
′(λ) (19)
respectively. Within the framework discussed above the
CHSH inequalities (1) necessarily hold.
B. A contextual Dempster-Shafer approach
We now offer an alternative approach to that above for
the modeling of EPRB-type experiments. As in section
IIA we achieve this using multi-valued maps. The re-
sulting framework shares many features in common with
Khrennikov’s contextual framework [6]. Our starting
point is the idea that even if we only considered mea-
suring the spin of a single particle in the different direc-
tions c = a, a′, a single Kolmogorov probability space
(Ω,ΣΩ, µ) would not offer an adequate description of the
experiment being envisioned. Using only a single space
makes it impossible to account for the fact that different
spin directions are not simultaneously measured. The
6latter is an operational fact, which must be properly
encoded within any theoretical treatment, regardless of
whether or not we make particular physical assumptions
like determinism or locality. Thus, the theory based on
a single Kolmogorov space must be appended in order
to properly account for the incompatibility between dif-
ferent experimental contexts. In short, we avoid making
the counterfactual assumption.
A single-particle context is assumed to be determined
by the alignment of the SG device. As both Bohr and
later Bell repeatedly emphasized should be the case, the
model of an experiment should describe the entire ex-
periment, rather than just the systems being measured
[14]. With this in mind we define Ω =
⋃
c Ωc where
c = a, a′, b, b′ are distinct SG device contexts. Each Ωc
can be decomposed as Ωc = +c ∪ −c with the sets ±c
corresponding to the possible spin outcomes along the
direction c.
Just like in section II we associate with each c a multi-
valued map Γc : Ω→ Σ{±} defined by
Γc(ω) :=


+ ω ∈ +c,
− ω ∈ −c,
{±} ω 6∈ Ωc.
(20)
The uncertainty in the event space within the context c, is
represented by the set Ωc which denotes the complement
of Ωc. We can also define the joint-context multi-valued
maps Γcc′ : Ω→ Σ{±} by
Γcc′(ω) :=
{
jk ω ∈ jc ∩ kc′ ,
{±} ω 6∈ Ωc ∩ Ωc′ .
(21)
As before we define the random variables Γc|Ωc =: C :
Ωc → {±}, whose domains are the domains of cer-
tainty of the Γc. We also define the product variables
CC′ := Γcc′ |Ωc∩Ωc′ . With respect to these observables
single-particle and two-particle probabilities are defined
by
µ(jc|Ωc) := 1
µ(Ωc)
∫
jc
dµ(ω),
µ(jc ∩ kc′ |Ωc ∩ Ωc′) := 1
µ(Ωc ∩ Ωc′)
∫
jc∩kc′
dµ(ω). (22)
The expressions in (23) are normalised over the domains
of certainty defined by Γc and Γcc′ respectively, and can
be interpreted as conditional probabilities. In a similar
fashion single-particle averages and two particle correla-
tions are defined as
〈C〉c := 1
µ(Ωc)
∫
Ωc
dµ(ω)C(ω),
〈CC′〉cc′ := 1
µ(Ωc ∩ Ωc′)
∫
Ωc∩Ωc′
dµ(ω)C(ω)C′(ω) (23)
where again each expression is normalised over a con-
text specific domain of certainty, and so represents a
conditional expectation. If we substitute correlations of
the form given in (23) into (1) we obtain as in section
II an upper bound on |f | of 4 rather than 2. Thus,
conditional probabilities and correlations do not satisfy
Bell-type inequalities. Of course, the interpretation of
quantum probabilities pertaining to EPRB experiments
as classical conditional probabilities is well-known [9, 15].
As in section IIIA we can map Ω into Rn. However,
since in general we expect the epistemic states of an ob-
server to depend on the context, we now associate with
each context c a “local” (as opposed to global) chart
Λc : Ωc → Rn defined over the domain of certainty Ωc.
With each joint context cc′ we associate another chart
Λcc′ : Ωc ∩ Ωc′ → Ω˜c ∩ Ω˜c′ defined over the domain of
certainty Ωc ∩Ωc′ . The local charts Λc give rise to mea-
sures Pc, epistemic states ρc, and observables C˜ defined
over Ω˜c := Λc(Ωc) ∈ B(Rn). Analogous measures, states
and observables are associated with the joint contexts
cc′. The set Ω˜c is the “concrete” domain of certainty
in B(Rn), that corresponds to the “abstract” domain of
certainty Ωc ∈ ΣΩ. The probabilities in (22) can now be
written
pc(C = j) := Pc(j˜c|Ω˜c) := 1
Pc(Ω˜c)
∫
j˜c
dnλρc(λ),
pcc′(C = j, C
′ = k) := Pcc′(j˜c ∩ k˜c′ |Ω˜c ∩ Ω˜c′)
:=
1
Pcc′(Ω˜c ∩ Ω˜c′)
∫
j˜c∩k˜c′
dnλρcc′(λ). (24)
The notation P (·|Ω˜c) does not necessarily denote a con-
ventional conditional probability within Rn, rather it
indicates that all probabilities pertaining to context c
are normalised over Ω˜c. In general one need not re-
quire that Pc(Ω˜c) ≤ 1. The normalisation factors in
(24) can be absorbed into the definition of the densi-
ties to yield absolute probabilities over the domains of
certainty. More precisely, defining P ′c := Pc/Pc(Ω˜c) and
P ′cc′ := Pcc′/Pcc′(Ω˜c ∩ Ω˜c′), we have
pc(C = j) = P
′
c(j˜c) =
∫
j˜c
dnλρ′c(λ),
pcc′(C = j, C
′ = k) = P ′cc′(j˜c ∩ k˜c′) =
∫
j˜c∩k˜c′
dnλρ′cc′(λ).
(25)
These normalised measures allow one to define condi-
tional probabilities within the domains of certainty in
the usual way. The averages in (23) can be written
〈C〉c = 1
Pc(Ω˜c)
∫
Ω˜c
dnλρc(λ) C˜(λ),
〈CC′〉cc′ = 1
Pc(Ω˜c ∩ Ω˜c′)
∫
Ω˜c∩Ω˜′c
dnλρc(λ) C˜(λ)C˜
′(λ).
(26)
Whenever the joint correlations in (26) can be expressed
in the form given in (19), the CHSH inequalities in (1)
7hold. This requires the existence of a common density
ρ(λ) corresponding to a global chart Λ : Ω → Rn, such
that every probability is normalised over the total space
Ω˜. Such a description would only generally be appro-
priate if all measurements within the experiment were
performed under the same physical conditions, that is,
within the same context. Note that when a global chart
is used but the probabilities are normalised only over the
domains of certainty, they can be interpreted as condi-
tional probabilities as in (22).
C. Discussion
Two different alignments of a SG device produce alto-
gether different inhomogeneous magnetic fields over the
spacetime region within which the spin measurement is
performed. In general, the physical conditions under
which a measurement is performed are at least partly
determined by the state of the measuring device, which
therefore influences the observed physical events. As Bell
himself puts it: “the results have to be regarded as the
joint product of ‘system’ and ‘apparatus’, the complete
experimental setup” [14]. In a deterministic theory the
set of all possessed values for the observables of a phys-
ical system can be divided into KPVs and UPVs. The
KPVs are what Bell calls “results”, while obviously the
UPVs are not “results”. As such UPVs should not be
regarded as the joint product of system and apparatus.
Rather, UPVs depend on the system alone. Moreover,
in EPRB-type experiments the UPVs pertain to spin ob-
servables that are operationally incompatible with the
spin observables that are actually measured to give the
KPVs. Crucially therefore, we cannot assume that the set
of KPVs is representative of the set of UPVs.. In other
words, if, in determining measurement outcomes, mea-
surement devices are active rather than passive, then the
counterfactual assumption is not valid whenever opera-
tionally incompatible observables are being considered.
Thus, we see that Bell’s own conception of measurement
cannot generally be reconciled with the counterfactual
assumption crucial for proving Bell-type inequalities.
In our approach distinct and incompatible states of a
measuring device result in different physical contexts c.
Each context c is associated with a multi-valued map Γc.
With respect to a given context c, the uncertainty associ-
ated with counterfactual events taking place in a different
context c′ 6= c, is non-Kolmogorovian epistemic uncer-
tainty pertaining to the underlying event space. This
leads to the conditioning of densities on measurement
contexts, and results in probabilities as in (22). These
probabilities are defined in terms of different measures
and are normalised over different domains. As a result
they are not constrained by Bell-type inequalities. The
contextual framework given here, offers an explanation
as to why violations of Bell-type inequalities have actu-
ally been observed in the lab [16] without resorting to
nonlocality or indeterminism.
1. Free will
In mathematical terms the contextual formulation
above uses multiple Kolmogorov probability spaces to
model the EPRB experiment. This is deemed appro-
priate because the experiment actually consists of four
incompatible experimental contexts. Thus, rather than
using a single measure P corresponding to which there is
a single density ρ, we use multiple densities ρc, which are
labeled by context. The assumption that a single density
suffices, so that
ρ(λ) = ρc(λ) (27)
is calledmeasurement independence in [17, 18], and is dis-
cussed in [19]. It is argued that this assumption encodes
the “free will” of the experimenter in choosing measure-
ment settings. Thus, the use of different Kolmogorov
probability spaces to model different and incompatible
(sub)experiments is somehow seen as violating the as-
sumption that observers have “free will”.
First we note that even when equation (27) holds, Bell-
type inequalities will generally be violated if the prob-
abilities involved are interpreted as conditional proba-
bilities [9, 15, 20]. Furthermore, absolute relative fre-
quency probabilities are necessarily absolute Kolmogoro-
vian probabilities and therefore they must satisfy Bell-
type inequalities. This means that quantum probabili-
ties violating Bell-type inequalities cannot be interpreted
as absolute frequency probabilities [15, 20]. A violation
of Bell-type inequalities can only be explained through
some sort of conditional probability model [15, 20].
The challenge one is faced with in constructing a de-
terministic hidden-variable model, is the reproduction
of the quantum predictions using either conventional
event-conditioned classical probabilities, or perhaps us-
ing context-conditioned classical probabilities [32]. Re-
garding the latter, one can simply interpret “measure-
ment dependence” as the assumption that incompati-
ble experimental contexts require separate probability
spaces. This is justified through the assumption that
experimental results are the product of the system and
the apparatus.
Consider, for example, a situation in which a physical
system S is prepared at time −t0 and that this results
in some ontic (possibly unknown) state λ(−t0). Suppose
that at time t = 0 the system is to be measured for some
duration T , with a device M whose state λc is always
known and can be controlled by the experimenter. In
many cases a reasonable assumption might be that the
state of the macroscopic measuring device is stationary
λc(t) = λc.
We can now define a “free will” condition as the as-
sumption that λc and λ are independent variables for
t < 0. This means that λc which can be chosen at any
time t < 0 is not constrained by the system S. How-
ever, during the measurement process S and M will cer-
tainly interact, so there is no good reason to assume
that λ(t) will be independent of λc for t ≥ 0. The
8probability density ρ(λ(t)) over ontic states taken at the
time of the measurement therefore depends on λc (as
well as λ(−t0) and other initial data). We can therefore
write ρ(λ(t)) = ρ(λ(−t0), λc, t) ≡ ρc(λ(−t0), t) for t ≥ 0.
Thus, if the probability to obtain a particular measure-
ment result is calculated from a density over ontic states
taken at the time of the measurement, then the probabil-
ities will be contextual. This does not violate “free will”,
but simply indicates that the system and measurement
device have interacted, so the result is not “measurement
independent”.
The above qualitative analysis implies that the measur-
ing device generally disturbs the system being measured
and so it is not passive within the experiment. The as-
sumption of a passive measurement device may often be
made when dealing with macroscopic systems in classical
physics, but this assumption is not a fundamental pos-
tulate of the latter, and it seems ill-justified when con-
sidering microscopic systems. Indeed, the assumption
that measurement devices are always passive in classical
physics introduces a kind of classical measurement prob-
lem in which measurement devices are given a privileged
role as special systems that do not disturb the systems
they interact with.
IV. RELATION TO CONVENTIONAL
APPROACHES
In this section we attempt to assess how the rigorous
treatment in III A, the contextual treatment in III B, and
conventional hidden-variable treatments found through-
out the physics literature, are each related to one another.
Throughout the physics literature pertaining to Bell-type
inequalities, one frequently encounters heuristic expres-
sions for what is known as Bell’s locality assumption writ-
ten in the form
pλ(j, k|a, b) = p1λ(j|a)p2λ(k|b). (28)
Here j and k are left and right-particle spin outcomes
respectively, a and b are left and right-SG device settings
respectively, and as usual λ is supposed to offer a com-
plete description of the underlying state of affairs. The
labels 1 and 2 in (28) refer to the left and right-particles
respectively. This particular notation was borrowed from
[21]. Sometimes one sees λ appearing as a conditioning
event as in the following expression, borrowed from a re-
cent article [22]
p(j, k|a, b) =
∫
dλ ρ(λ)p(j, k|a, b, λ). (29)
In our notation (28) would read
pab(A = j, B = k|λ) = pa(A = j|λ)pb(B = k|λ) (30)
though we have not yet offered an interpretation of the
conditioning of our probabilities on an underlying phys-
ical state λ. This will be done in what follows.
A. The role of conditional probabilities
The probabilities on the left-hand-side in (29) are our
primary interest as these are the probabilities appear-
ing in Bell-type inequalities. Let us therefore focus on
the left-hand-side of (29). Suppose that we treat the de-
vice settings a and b as genuine conditioning events in
an event space Ω. This, after all, is what the notations
in (28) and (29) suggest we should do. As soon as we
choose to do this it becomes impossible to avoid includ-
ing a description of the SG devices within the probabilis-
tic treatment of the experiment. Proceeding along this
line of inquiry, our aim in this section is to relate the
expressions in (28) and (29) to the expressions derived in
III B. To this end we interpret the left-hand-side of (29)
as being given by (24);
pab(A = j, B = k) = Pab(j˜a ∩ k˜b|Ω˜a ∩ Ω˜b). (31)
Now we would like to determine whether or not the right-
hand-side of (29) can be understood as being equal to
the right-hand-side of (31). The probabilities in (28)
and (29) are supposed to be conditioned on the settings
of the SG devices. This gives the impression that the
states of the measuring devices have been properly taken
into account. However, the expressions obtained do not
represent true conditional probabilities, because they are
not normalised as such. Rather they are normalised by
µ(Ω) = 1. Perhaps the conditioning is supposed to have
been taken care of by the hidden-variables λ. Let us
investigate this possibility.
In the rigorous measure-theoretic formulation of Kol-
mogorov probability theory (c.f. [23–25]) a probability
density is associated with a real random vector Λ : Ω→
R
n, which defines a measure PΛ := µ ◦ Λ−1 : B(Rn) →
[0, 1] where B(Rn) is the set of Borel subsets of Rn. Note
that the domain of PΛ implies that Λ
−1 : B(Rn) → ΣΩ
denotes the pre-image map, which is well-defined whether
or not Λ is invertible. In turn one can define an absolutely
continuous distribution FΛ(λ) := PΛ(Bλ) ≡ µ(Λ ≤ λ)
where Bλ := (−∞, λ1] × ... × (−∞, λn] ∈ B(Rn). The
associated density is defined as ρΛ := ∂
nFΛ/∂λ1...∂λn.
Formally ρΛ(λ) can be thought of as the probability that
Λ = λ, and could be denoted µ(Λ = λ). One can ex-
tend the construction to deal with conditional proba-
bilities by defining for S = Λ−1(B) ∈ ΣΩ the measure
µS := µ(·|S) := µ(· ∩ S)/µ(S). With this one can define
a measure PΛ|B over B(Rn) as
PΛ|B(B
′) := µ(Λ−1(B′)|Λ−1(B)) = 1
µ(S)
∫
Λ−1(B∩B′)
dµ
=
1
PΛ(B)
∫
B∩B′
dPΛ. (32)
Then one defines the conditional distribution FΛ|B(λ) :=
9PΛ|B(Bλ) and the associated density
ρΛ|B(λ) :=
∂nFΛ|B(λ)
∂λ1...∂λn
=
ρΛ(λ)δB(λ)
PΛ(B)
=
ρΛ(λ)δB∫
B
dnλρΛ(λ)
(33)
where δB is the Dirac measure associated with B;
δB(λ) =
{
1 λ ∈ B,
0 λ 6∈ B. (34)
According to this definition ρΛ|B(λ) is normalised to
unity indicating that it is a genuine probability density.
Equation (33) yields for a subset S′ = Λ−1(B′) ∈ ΣΩ
with B′ ∈ B(R), the following expression for a condi-
tional probability written in terms of the corresponding
density;
µ(S′|S) = PΛ(B′|B) = PΛ(B
′ ∩B)
PΛ(B)
=
∫
B′
dnλρΛ|B(λ)
=
∫
B′∩B d
nλρΛ(λ)∫
B
dnλρΛ(λ)
. (35)
Finally, we can define the conditional probability
PΛ(B|λ) by
PΛ(B|λ)ρΛ(λ) = PΛ(B)ρΛ|B(λ) (36)
whenever ρΛ(λ) 6= 0 almost everywhere (except on a set
of measure zero). Comparing this expression with (33)
yields
PΛ(B|λ) = δB(λ). (37)
This result is precisely what we should expect to find,
because we are assuming that λ represents the precise
state of affairs within the underlying physical reality. If
we are given λ we can be certain which events will and
will not occur. The quantity PΛ(B|λ) represents the
probability of event B given λ. Thus, PΛ(B|λ) must
be either 0 or 1. More precisely, the event B is certain
to occur if λ ∈ B and certain not to occur otherwise,
hence PΛ(B|λ) = δB(λ). Another way to view PΛ(B|λ)
is as the probability of B given that the epistemic state
ρΛ is the delta function ρΛ(λ
′) = δ(λ − λ′), which cor-
responds to the situation in which we have complete
knowledge of the underlying reality. Borrowing terminol-
ogy from quantum theory, delta-function epistemic states
ρΛ(λ
′) = δ(λ − λ′) could be termed pure states, with all
other epistemic states termed mixed states. These pure
states are clearly in one-to-one correspondence with the
ontic states λ. Now, from either (37), or directly from
(36), it follows that
PΛ(B) =
∫
dnλρΛ(λ)PΛ(B|λ) =
∫
B
dnλρΛ(λ) (38)
of which the first equality appears to be quite close to
what we see in (29). Before we use the above formalism in
analysing the conventional hidden-variable approaches,
it may be instructive to see it in action using a simple
example.
Consider a point particle moving in one-dimensional
Euclidean space E1. With initial conditions the second
order dynamics resulting from Newton’s laws defines a
well-posed Cauchy problem. A position value and veloc-
ity (momentum) value suffice to give a complete physi-
cal description of the particle. Thus, the state (event)
space is Ω = T ∗E1, which denotes the cotangent bun-
dle of E1. We can turn the manifold T ∗E1 into a Kol-
mogorov space by equipping it with a Kolmogorov mea-
sure µ : ΣT∗Eq → [0, 1] where ΣT∗E1 is a suitable σ-
algebra. Since T ∗E1 is a flat manifold it admits a global
coordinate chart Λ : T ∗E1 → R2, which is associated
with some family of observers O. A particle state is a
phase point ω ∈ T ∗E1 with coordinate representation
Λ(ω) = (x, p) ∈ R2 relative to O. A particle observable is
a suitably well-behaved (e.g. smooth, square-integrable)
function f : T ∗E1 → R, which admits the coordinate rep-
resentation f˜ := f ◦Λ−1 : R2 → R. Finally PΛ := µ◦Λ−1
defines a normalised Kolmogorov measure on R2 and an
epistemic state associated with the observers O is an in-
tegrable density ρΛ such that
PΛ(U˜) =
∫
U˜
dx dp ρΛ(x, p) (39)
where U˜ := Λ(U) and U ∈ ΣT∗E1 . Different choices of ρΛ
correspond to different choices of PΛ, which correspond
to different choices of µ. This means that different choices
of ρΛ encode different epistemic states of Kolmogorovian
uncertainty regarding the ontic state of the particle ω ∈
T ∗E1. The average value of observable f measured by
observers O with epistemic state ρΛ is
〈f〉 :=
∫
R2
dx dp ρΛ(x, p)f˜(x, p). (40)
The probability that relative to O the particle’s state
belongs in U˜ := Λ(U) is
µ(U) = PΛ(U˜) =
∫
U˜
dx dp ρΛ(x, p)
=
∫
R2
dx dp δU˜ (x, p)ρΛ(x, p). (41)
If ρΛ(x, p) = δ(x− x0)δ(p− p0) the observers know with
certainty that the state of the particle has coordinate
representation (x0, p0) relative to them. They therefore
know with certainty whether or not the state belongs in
U , i.e., whether or not (x0, p0) belongs in U˜ . For this
particular epistemic state the probability in (41) is equal
to one if (x0, p0) ∈ U˜ and equal to zero otherwise, i.e.,
PΛ(U˜) =
∫
R2
dx dp δU˜ (x, p)δ(x − x0)δ(p− p0)
= δU˜ (x0, p0) ≡ PΛ(U˜ |x0, p0). (42)
10
For general ρΛ, (41) can be written
PΛ(U˜) =
∫
R2
dx dp ρΛ(x, p)δU˜ (x, p)
=
∫
R2
dx dp ρΛ(x, p)P (U˜ |x, p) (43)
which is just a specific example of expression (38).
B. Comparison of conventional and contextual
approaches
Having determined with the formalism above precisely
how to interpret probabilities that are conditioned on the
ontic state λ and having seen this formalism work in a
simple setting, we now have all the ingredients we need
in order to compare conventional approaches with our
contextual Dempster-Shafer approach. First we use (37)
to interpret the probabilities in (30) as
pab(A = j, B = k|λ) = δj˜a∩k˜b(λ), (44)
which using (25) and (38) yields
pab(A = j, B = k) =
∫
dnλρ′ab(λ)pab(A = j, B = k|λ).
(45)
Equation (45) is similar to (29), but of course the prob-
abilities in (45) are defined differently to those in (29).
Unlike those in (29), the probabilities in (45) do not obey
Bell-type inequalities. The main difference between (45)
and (29) is that in the latter the labels a, b pertaining
to the measurement devices appear to be merely nota-
tional tools, while in the former they take an active role
in defining the probability measures Pab (and hence ρab),
and in properly normalising the resulting probabilities.
The question arises as to the sense in which our ap-
proach can be considered local. Although Bell considered
his locality assumption (28) crucial for the proof of his
theorem, it was noted some time ago by Accardi, that
the crucial assumption underlying Bell-type inequalities
is the counterfactual assumption not Bell’s locality as-
sumption [26, 27]. In fact Accardi has shown that Bell’s
inequalities hold for spin random-variables defined over a
single Kolmogorov space, even if one assumes the nega-
tion of his locality assumption [26].
The idea underlying our contextual framework is that
observed physical events in an experiment are dependent
on both the measured systems and the measurement de-
vices. While this invalidates the counterfactual assump-
tion, Bell’s locality assumption (30) remains perfectly in-
tact, and is satisfied as an immediate consequence of (44)
and the identity δA∩B ≡ δAδB. Moreover, given that λ
is supposed represent the complete ontic state of the sys-
tem, it is difficult to see how to interpret probabilities
conditioned on λ in any other way besides as Dirac mea-
sures of the form δA(λ). Indeed the formalism of section
IV, which leads to (37), is general enough to include any
ontic state of the type encountered in classical physics.
But if this is indeed our only option, then λ-conditioned
probabilities will always trivially satisfy Bell’s locality
assumption.
V. EXAMPLE
In this section we examine a model of EPRB-type ex-
periments that fits within our contextual approach. The
model is quite similar to a model originally proposed by
Barut and Meystre [28], and is designed to reproduce the
quantum predictions.
A. The model
To begin with we consider one particle and two orienta-
tions c = a, a′ of an SG device. For simplicity we restrict
the model to two spatial dimensions (the xz-plane). The
spin observable in the c-direction C =: Ωc → {±} is
defined by
C(ωc) =
{
+ ωc ∈ +c
− ωc ∈ −c.
(46)
We consider a classical particle with angular-momentum
spin unit-vector S, which can be fully specified by an
angle λ relative to the z-axis. We fix the unit vector
c = a, a′ giving the alignment of the SG device, which
can be fully specified by an angle λc. We define the chart
Λc : Ωc → R by
Λc(ωc) =
{
λ− λc ωc ∈ +c
λ− λ−c ωc ∈ −c.
(47)
We now choose the sets ±c such that together (46) and
(47) yield the representation C˜ : Ω˜c → {±} defined by
C˜(λ) =
{
+ λ− λc ∈ [−pi/2, pi/2)
− λ− λ−c ∈ [−pi/2, pi/2) .
(48)
Since λ−c ≡ λc + pi, the sets ±˜c are given by
+˜c =
[
λc − pi
2
, λc +
pi
2
)
, −˜c =
[
λc +
pi
2
, λc +
3pi
2
)
.
(49)
which respectively represent the north and south hemi-
spheres of the sphere for which c specifies the north pole.
The set Ω˜c = +˜c ∪ −˜c evidently represents to the whole
sphere.
The density associated with the measure Pc for this
example is defined as
ρc(λ) := N | cos(λ − λc)| =
{
N cos(λ − λc) λ ∈ +˜c
−N cos(λ− λc) λ ∈ −˜c
(50)
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where N is an arbitrary normalisation constant. The
associated nomalised density is therefore
ρ′c(λ) :=
{
1
4 cos(λ− λc) λ ∈ +˜c
− 14 cos(λ− λc) λ ∈ −˜c.
(51)
The factor cos(λ−λc) gives the component of S in the c-
direction whenever S belongs to the northern hemisphere
+˜c. Likewise − cos(λ − λc) gives the component of S
in the direction −c whenever S belongs to the southern
hemisphere −˜c. Thus, the probability densities to obtain
the values + and − are proportional to the component
of the spin in the positive and negative direction of the
SG alignment. Note that the density in (50) is positive
semi-definite on the domain of certainty Ω˜c. Using (22)
and (50) we obtain the single-particle probabilities
pc(±) = Pc(±˜c|Ω˜c) = P ′c(±˜c) =
1
2
. (52)
The average spin measured when the SG alignment is c
is
〈C〉c =
∫
Ω˜c
dλρc(λ)C˜(λ) =
∑
j=±
∫
j˜c
dλ ρc(λ)C˜(λ) = 0.
(53)
The probabilities pc(±) = 1/2 are the same as the quan-
tum probabilities
pψ(±) := 1
2
(
1∓ c · 〈σ1 ⊗ I2〉ψ
)
=
1
2
(54)
where σ1 denotes the Pauli operator-valued three-vector
for the particle being considered, and I2 denotes the 2-
dimensional identity operator on the Hilbert space of a
second particle. The average in (54) is taken in the two-
particle entangled (Bell) state
|ψ〉 := 1√
2
(
|↑S〉1 ⊗ |↓S〉2 − |↓S〉1 ⊗ |↑S〉2
)
(55)
and like 〈C〉c in (53) it is equal to zero.
In this example there is a clear distinction between
the spin of the particle in the c-direction Sc and the spin
observable in the c-direction, which is C˜ 6= Sc. This is be-
cause what is observed in the experiment depends on the
entire experimental arrangement, including the measur-
ing device. The observable C represents a joint system-
apparatus observable and the results are “regarded as the
joint product of system and apparatus...”[14]. It is inter-
esting to note that in a sense this is also how the quantum
formalism works. The state of the particle pair is given
by (55) with the label S referring to the particles, but
with no explicit reference being made to the alignment c
of either SG device. Meanwhile the observables (projec-
tions) pi±c := (1∓ c ·σ)/2 clearly refer to both a particle
and its measuring device.
Let us now consider the full two-particle EPRB setup.
Along with the first SG device measuring the left-
particle, we consider a second SG device with possible
alignments b, b′ measuring the right-particle. The total
spin of the particle pair is zero, so the right-particle has
spin −S, which is opposite to that of the left-particle.
Thus, for the right-particle the spin observable in the
context c has value + when −S has positive component
in the direction c, and has value − otherwise;
C˜(λ) =
{
+ λ− λ−c ∈ [−pi/2, pi/2)
− λ− λc ∈ [−pi/2, pi/2)
(56)
where C = B,B′. The sets ±˜c, c = b, b′ are given by
+˜c =
[
λc +
pi
2
, λc +
3pi
2
)
, −˜c =
[
λc − pi
2
, λc +
pi
2
)
.
(57)
We now define the normalised joint-context probability
densities ρ′cc′ with c = a, a
′ and c′ = b, b′ by
ρ′cc′(λ) = αρ
′
c(λ) + βρ
′
c′(λ) (58)
where α, β ∈ [0, 1] are constants such that α + β = 1.
For a particular choice of α and β the above definition
uniquely specifies ρ′cc′ on the whole domain Ω˜c∩Ω˜c′ . The
fact that ρ′cc′ can be expressed as a normalised combina-
tion of single-particle densities seems similar to the quan-
tum superposition principle, but actually apart from the
requirement that α+ β = 1 one has complete freedom in
the choice of α and β.
Despite the fact that the EPRB-setup involves two par-
ticles, there is only one unknown quantity λ. The proba-
bility pab(j, k) can be thought of as the probability that λ
belongs to both j˜a and k˜b, so it is obtained by integrating
the density ρ′a over the intersection j˜a ∩ k˜b. Since ρ′b is
obtained from ρ′a by a shift in coordinate axes and an al-
ternative choice of α and β, pab(j, k) can also be obtained
by integrating ρ′b over j˜a∩k˜b. To understand this freedom
note that since the context ab is the simultaneous reali-
sation of contexts a and b the observables A, B and AB
are trivially compatible. We can therefore say that the
contexts a, b and ab are themselves compatible—they can
be simultaneously realised. Indeed ab can be viewed as a
restriction of either one of the contexts a or b due to the
other one. This is reflected by the domains of certainty
through the relations Ω˜a ∩ Ω˜b ⊂ Ω˜a and Ω˜a ∩ Ω˜b ⊂ Ω˜b.
The densities ρ′a and ρ
′
b quantify the (Kolmogorovian)
epistemic uncertainty in λ within the contexts a and b re-
spectively, i.e., over the domains Ω˜a and Ω˜b respectively.
Since ρ′a and ρ
′
b quantify the same uncertainty relative to
different domains, the joint probabilities found using ρ′a
and ρ′b should coincide on the common domain Ω˜a ∩ Ω˜b.
Because this is the case ρ′ab is uniquely interpretable as
quantifying the uncertainty in λ within the context ab.
In the case c = a, c′ = b (58) yields
pab(+,+) =
1
4
[1− cos(λa − λb)] = pab(−,−)
pab(+,−) = 1
4
[1 + cos(λa − λb)] = pab(−,+), (59)
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which are the same as the quantum predictions obtained
using the Bell state (55). The average 〈AB〉ab can be
calculated from the probabilities above as
〈AB〉ab =
∑
pab(j = k)−
∑
pab(j 6= k)
= − cos(λa − λb) = −a · b, (60)
which is the same as the corresponding quantum expecta-
tion value. It should be clear from this that the present
model completely reproduces the quantum predictions,
but is also completely classical and deterministic.
We note finally that if one chooses the normalisation
N = 1/8 in (50) then Pc(Ω˜c) = 1/2 can be viewed as
the probability that the SG device setting c is selected.
Similarly one can define Pcc′ such that Pcc′(Ω˜c ∩ Ω˜c′) =
Pc(Ω˜c)Pc′(Ω˜c′) = 1/4 can be viewed as the probability
that c and c′ are selected. This normalisation is appropri-
ate for modeling Aspect’s experiment in which switches
randomly flip between polarisers a and a′ as well as be-
tween b and b′ during the propagation of the light mea-
sured [16]. The probabilities in (52) and (62) can then be
understood as the conditional probabilities for outcomes
given particular device settings are selected.
B. On the question of locality
We consider here the status of the above model with
regard to the question of locality.
1. Bell’s locality
Bell’s locality assumption is satisfied in the form
pab(j, k|λ) = δj˜a∩k˜b(λ) = δj˜a(λ)δk˜b (λ) = pa(j|λ)pb(k|λ)
(61)
where the sets ±˜a are defined in (49), and the sets ±˜b
are defined in (57). The above is of course just a special
case of (30), which holds generally within our contextual
framework.
2. Einstein locality
We comment now on another notion of locality. The
model above could be deemed to be local if in the two-
particle case, all single-particle probabilities are identical
to those obtained in the single-particle case. This condi-
tion is called Einstein causality, also known as parameter
independence [21], Einstein locality [29], or simply local-
ity [29, 30]. It refers to the impossibility of superluminal
signaling. Parameter independence is satisfied within the
above model. To see this note that the single-particle
probabilities in (52) refer to a particle for which the spin
is measured along the a, a′ directions, with no reference
being made to any other particles or any other SG de-
vices. In the model of the full two-particle EPRB-setup,
single-particle probabilities for the left-particle are given
for c = a, a′ by
pc(j|λ) =
∑
k=±
pcb(j, k|λ) =
∑
k=±
pcb′(j, k|λ),
pc(j) =
∑
k=±
pcb(j, k) =
∑
k=±
pcb′(j, k), (62)
and the probabilities pc(j) above are identical to those
found in (52). Thus, the probabilities pertaining to the
left-particle obtained by considering the full two-particle
setup, are identical to those obtained in the case that no
right-particle exists. In particular the probabilities on the
left-hand-side in (62) are independent of the context label
c′ = b, b′ chosen for the right-particle. The above result
is analogous to the “no-signalling” theorems of quantum
theory [31].
3. Discussion
There are numerous situations in classical physics in
which spacelike separated events are statistically corre-
lated. This instantaneous action-at-a-distance is associ-
ated with logical inference rather than causal influence,
so no violations of causality ensue. For example, if the
spin of the left-particle S is found to be + in the di-
rection a, then we know with certainty that the spin of
the right-particle is − in the direction a, and this logical
inference propagates instantaneously. Outcome indepen-
dence is the condition of statistical independence given
the underlying ontic state λ;
p1λ(j|a) = pλ(j|a, k), p2λ(k|b) = pλ(k|j, b) (63)
where we have again borrowed the notation from [21].
Together, parameter independence and outcome inde-
pendence are equivalent to Bell’s locality assumption [30].
Any theory consistent with special relativity must sat-
isfy Einstein causality. However, it appears that quan-
tum theory violates outcome independence, where clas-
sical theory cannot. This means that quantum theory is
nonlocal in a sense that classical theory is not. In the
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory, a particle
can only be said to possess a definite spin value if it is
in an eigenstate of the appropriate spin operator. In this
sense quantum theory is indeterministic. As a result, in
quantum theory a violation of outcome independence oc-
curs when a measurement is made on the left-particle in
the Bell state (55), because this measurement physically
determines the spin of the right-particle through the col-
lapse of the composite superposition (55). Prior to the
measurement of the left-particle, the right-particle could
not be said to possess a definite spin value, because the
Bell state (55) is not an eigenstate of the right-particle’s
spin operator. This nonlocal action is viewed as the cause
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of the correlations predicted, which cannot then be in-
terpreted as due to mere logical inferences. This is what
Einstein described as “spooky action-at-a-distance”.
Since experiments violate the CHSH inequalities, it is
alleged that the “spooky action-at-a-distance” of quan-
tum theory must be accepted. There are two fallacies
from which this conclusion results. The first is that
Bell-type inequalities rest upon Bell’s locality assump-
tion, and in particular on outcome independence. The
second is that classical theories cannot violate Bell-type
inequalities. Of course, quantum theory is (by definition)
non-classical. What is more, in the Copenhagen inter-
pretation it is not deterministic, and it violates outcome
independence. It also happens to violate Bell-type in-
equalities. However, this does not imply that the only
way to violate Bell-type inequalities is to use a non-
classical, nonlocal, indeterministic theory. Actually as we
have shown, one can reproduce the quantum predictions
with a completely deterministic, local, classical theory,
provided one adopts a sufficiently refined view towards
measurement. As a result the fallacious conclusion that
Bell’s inequalities necessarily impose constraints on clas-
sical physics should be summarily disregarded.
The example above is purely classically deterministic,
so one can argue that in this context the only meaning-
ful notion of locality is Einstein causality, i.e., parameter
independence. One does not need to distinguish between
two types of locality, and explanations for certain corre-
lations as resulting from a “spooky action-at-a-distance”
are unnecessary. Having eliminated the false idea that
classical correlations cannot violate Bell-type inequali-
ties one is free to interpret the correlations observed in a
purely classical way.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have introduced an alternative probabilistic model
of EPRB-type experiments using multi-valued maps of
the kind found in Dempster-Shafer probability theory
[7, 8]. This has lead to a contextual approach, which
appears to be similar in nature to Khrennikov’s [6, 9].
Our approach gives an explicit link between measurement
contexts and counterfactual outcomes. The uncertainty
associated with the latter is non-Kolmogorovian epis-
temic uncertainty in the underlying event space Ω, which
is divided up according to different measurement contexts
using the multi-valued maps. These concepts have been
applied to both phenomenological and hidden-variable
treatments of Bell-type inequalities. In both cases the
counterfactual assumption is seen to be invalid. The en-
suing non-Kolmogorovian epistemic uncertainty leads to
context conditioned probabilities that do not obey Bell-
type inequalities.
The conditioning of probabilities on measurement con-
texts can be viewed as the result of a formulation in which
the measurement devices are not passive, but active in
determining physical events. This idea of what should
be taken to constitute a “measurement” was advocated
by Bell long ago [14]. What appears not to have been
recognised by many physicists is that this has implica-
tions for classical as well as quantum physics. It implies
that the restriction to a single Kolmogorov probability
space should not be viewed as a necessity for a classical
description. Kolmogorov probability theory and classi-
cal physics are two distinct theories—one is a theory of
probability and one is a theory of physics. Although in
some cases they may be inter-related, it is a mistake to
conflate assumptions about the former with assumptions
about the latter. This is precisely the mistake one makes
in concluding that Bell-type inequalities constrain classi-
cal physics.
While the context-conditioned probabilities we have
obtained do not obey Bell-type inequalities, there is noth-
ing about our approach which precludes classical, deter-
ministic, local physical models. In particular we have
constructed a local and deterministic classical model,
which reproduces the quantum-mechanical predictions.
From this point of view, the incorrect conclusion that vi-
olations of Bell-type inequalities rule out deterministic,
local, classical theories simply results from an oversim-
plified conception of measurement.
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